

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 NEAE-00 CIAE-00
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O 031505Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5458
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
DIA WASHDC
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TRIPOLI 0671

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PBOR, LY, CD
SUBJECT: LIBYAN POSITION ON CEASE-FIRE IN CHAD

REF: (A) TRIPOLI 0609 (NOTAL), (B) TRIPOLI 0614 (NOTAL),
(C) TRIPOLI 0629 (NOTAL), (D) USUN 1740 (NOTAL),
(E) NDJAMENA 1723 (NOTAL)

BEGIN SUMMARY: JALUD'S MAY 1 COMMENTS ON CHAD DO NOT REPRESENT
CHANGE IN LIBYAN POLICY WHICH HAS BEEN CONSISTENT, IF DISIN-
GENUOUS, SINCE MARCH SEBHA II CEASEFIRE. PUBLICLY, LIBYA
SUPPORTS CEASE-FIRE WHILE STRONGLY CONDEMNING FRENCH INTERVEN-
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TION AS EXACERBATING SITUATION. LIBYA HAS NEVER PUBLICLY
ACCUSED FROLINAT OF VIOLATING CEASE-FIRE NOR HAS IT EVER
SUPPORTED FROLINAT'S APPARENT RENUNCIATION OF SEBHA
ACCORD. PRIVATELY, MEANWHILE, LIBYA PROBABLY ENCOURAGED
FROLINAT'S RECENT OFFENSIVE FOLLOWING MALLOUM'S PERSONAL
DEMARCHE TO QADHAFI APRIL 9 CLARIFYING THAT CHAD GOVERN-
MENT'S INTERPRETATION OF SEBHA DID NOT INCLUDE RECOGNITION

OF FROLINAT AND WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH PRESENCE, TWO OF QADHAFI'S PRIMARY GOALS IN CHAD. LIBYANS NOW PROBABLY WANT TO SEE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GOC AND FROLINAT WHICH WILL REAFFIRM CONCESSIONS GRANTED TO THE REBELS AT SEBHA AS A PERQUISITE FOR THE "FINAL" RECONCILIATION PLANNED JUNE 7 IN TRIPOLI. END SUMMARY.

1. JALUD'S MAYDAY ADDRESS CONTAINED DETAILED COMMENTS ON CURRENT CHAD SITUATION WHICH REITERATED -- BUT DID NOT ALTER -- GENERAL THRUST OF LIBYA'S POLICY. JALUD DECLARED THAT OBJECTIVE OF FRENCH INTERVENTION WAS "TO UNDERMINE THE AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION IN CHAD," AND HE HELD THE FRENCH RESPONSIBLE "IN CASE THIS AGREEMENT FAILS." HE NOTED THAT THE "SENDING OF MORE TROOPS AND JAGUAR AIRCRAFT TO CHAD IS "COMPLICATING AND UNDERMINING THE SITUATION" AND THAT "THE RIGHT THING TO HAVE DONE AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT WAS TO CONTAIN THE FRENCH FORCES, NOT TO SEND MORE AIRCRAFT AND MORE FORCES." JALUD ADDED QUOTE WE WARN AND WE HOLD THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE IN CASE THIS AGREEMENT FAILS UNQUOTE. AS FOR MALLOUM, JALUD STATED QUOTE WE INFORMED HIM OF ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE THE AGREEMENT UNQUOTE AND HE EXPLAINED THAT THOSE UNDERMINING THE SEBHA AGREEMENT ARE DOING SO TO PREVENT AFRICANS FROM RESOLVING "THEIR PROBLEM" IN CHAD AND TO DEPRIVE THEM OF THE SELF-CONFIDENCE THEY NEED TO SOLVE OTHER PROBLEMS SUCH AS ERITREA.
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1. ALTHOUGH QADHAFI'S POSTURING TOWARDS CHAD HAS BEEN HOLLOW AND TWO-FACED, IT HAS NEVERTHELESS BEEN CONSISTENT SINCE MALLOUM'S APRIL 8-9 VISIT TO TRIPOLI. ESSENTIALLY, LIBYA'S POLICY IS COMPOSED OF TWO CONTRADICTORY BUT SELF-SERVING APPROACHES: THE PUBLIC APPROACH EMPHASIZES QADHAFI'S ROLE AS "PEACEMAKER" AND STRIVES TO PLACE LIBYA AT CENTER OF A "PROGRESSIVE," "NON-ALIGNED," "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" CONSTELLATION, WHILE THE PRIVATE APPROACH SEEKS TO ACHIEVE SPECIFIC TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL GOALS IN CHAD.

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3. THUS, PUBLICLY, LIBYA SUPPORTS SEBHA AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE MALLOUM REGIME, IGNORES FROLINAT'S OPEN TRANS- GRESSIONS, AND FEIGNS DISTURBANCE AT WHAT FRENCH INTER- VENTION FOREBODES FOR ALL OF AFRICA. PRIVATELY, LIBYA HAS TACITLY SUPPORTED, IF NOT ORGANIZED, LATEST FROLINAT OFFENSIVE WHICH AIMS NOT SO MUCH AT MALLOUM'S IMMEDIATE DOWNFALL AS AT SECURING NDJAMENA'S ACCEPTANCE OF LIBYA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SEBHA AGREEMENT -- I.E. RECOGNITION FOR "PROGRESSIVE" FROLINAT AND A TERMINATION OF THE FRENCH PRESENCE.

4. AT PRESENT, LIBYA IS CONFIDENT THAT ITS TWO-PRONGED
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STRATEGY IS WORKING. ON THE ONE HAND, NO ONE HAS OPENLY POINTED THE FINGER AT LIBYA'S MEDDLING, DESPITE REPORTS OF FRANK EXCHANGES WITH LIBYAN LEADERS ON THE PART OF CHADIAN, FRENCH AND SUDANESE OFFICIALS. CHAD'S FORMAL COMPLAINT TO UNITED NATIONS IS GOOD CASE-IN-POINT (REF- TELD). DESPITE ALLUSION TO "FOREIGN AGGRESSION," CHAD GROUPS LIBYA WITH SUDAN AND NIGER AS ONE OF THE PARTIES STRIVING FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, AN IDENTIFICATION WHICH IS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF LIBYA'S "PUBLIC" APPROACH TOWARDS CHAD ISSUE.

5. INDEED, JALUD -- ECHOING A WARNING ISSUED BY QADHAFI APRIL 17 (REFTEL A) -- WARNED IN HIS MAYDAY ADDRESS THAT QUOTE IF THE (SEBHA) AGREEMENT WAS MEANT TO BE AN UN-ETHICAL TACTICAL OPERATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF REGAINING STRENGTH AND REGROUPING AND FOR ASKING FOR MORE FRENCH FORCES AND ALSO FOR MASSING POTENTIALS IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE WAR, WE WARN AGAINST ANY ATTEMPT TO EVEN THINK ABOUT THIS METHOD UNQUOTE.

6. THE QUESTION WHICH THEN ARISES IS: WHAT HAPPENS NEXT? THE TRIPOLI MEDIA HAVE PERHAPS GIVEN SOME INDICATION. IN AN UNUSUALLY EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF CHAD EVENTS EVENING OF MAY 1, RADIO TRIPOLI REPORTED THAT MALLOUM ON APRIL 29 CALLED ON FROLINAT "TO HOLD NEW TALKS WITH HIM FOR A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SETTLEMENT." SAME NEWS BULLETIN FOR FIRST TIME NOTED BOTH MALLOUM'S ACCUSATIONS THAT FROLINAT FIRST BROKE CEASE-FIRE AND THE FRONT'S RESPONSE THAT THE CHAD MILITARY COUNCIL HAD VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT QUOTE BY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY ITS MOST IMPORTANT PROVISION -- THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND REFRAINING FROM SEEKING THE HELP OF FRENCH FORCES TO SOLVE INTERNAL PROBLEMS UNQUOTE.

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7. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE AND FROLINAT'S CURRENTLY STRONG POSITION WITHIN CHAD, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT LIBYA WILL NOW ENCOURAGE FURTHER GOC/FROLINAT DISCUSSIONS, PERHAPS UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE JOINT MILITARY COMMITTEE. THE AIM OF THESE TALKS WOULD NOT BE A NEW ACCORD BUT TO BRING CHAD'S INTERPRETATION OF SEBHA II MORE INTO LINE WITH LIBYA'S, THEREBY PAVING THE WAY FOR THE FINAL RECONCILIATION MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 7 IN TRIPOLI. SUCH A SCENARIO BODES ILL FOR THE MALLOUM GOVERNMENT, BUT THE LIBYANS AND FROLINAT ARE FULLY AWARE THAT THEY PRESENTLY HAVE THE UPPER HAND, AND IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THEY INTEND TO USE IT. CARLE

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